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ABSTRACT
Because of increasing accident rates in   Army  helicopters in hover and low speed flight, a study was made in 1999 of
accidents which could be attributed to inadequate stability augmentation. A study of   civil  helicopter accidents from
1993–2004 was then undertaken to pursue the issue of poor handling qualities in helicopters which, in almost all cases,
had no stability augmentation. The vast majority of the mishaps studied occurred during daylight in visual
meteorological condition, reducing the impact of degraded visual environments (DVE) on the results. Based on the
Cooper-Harper Rating Scale, the handling qualities of many of the helicopters studied could be described as having from
“very objectionable” to “major” deficiencies. These costly deficiencies have resulted in unnecessary loss of life, injury,
and high dollar damage. Low cost and lightweight augmentation systems for helicopters have been developed in the past
and are still being investigated. They offer the potential for significant reductions in the accident rate.
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INTRODUCTION
Concerned by a trend of increasing accident rates, Key
published the results of a survey of accidents that occurred
during hover and low speed flight involving four types of
Army helicopters (ref. 1). The implications of handling
qualities deficiencies in the accidents analyzed in these
pilot error mishaps were of primary interest. The
helicopters studied spanned the range from the OH-58D
Kiowa, a small reconnaissance helicopter, to the large
cargo transport CH-47, and included the AH-64 Apache
attack helicopter and the UH-60 Blackhawk. All of these
aircraft were equipped with a rate command stability
augmentation system (SAS) which provides pitch, roll,
and yaw rate damping inputs of small magnitude at
relatively high frequency to the control system. These
helicopters had been flight tested and their handling
qualities were assessed as marginal. It was Key’s
contention that the modification of the rate command
systems to provide attitude command response would
significantly reduce the accident rates. With an attitude
command system the control augmentation generally has
increased authority, and attitude changes are proportional
to stick displacement. Motivated by these results and
conclusions, a study of civil helicopter accidents was
undertaken to pursue the issue of handling qualities and the
role that they might play in causing or contributing to
mishaps. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
accident summaries were studied and analyzed for the period
1993–2004 (ref. 2). Only hover, hover taxi, and low speed
flight summaries were considered, as these represented a
significant but bounded portion of the total number of
mishaps (fig. 1). In addition to limiting the scope of the
inquiry to a manageable level, this data set examined a
unique aspect of rotorcraft operations which accounted for a
significant portion of the civil rotorcraft mishaps. It also
aligned the study with the results of the earlier Key study
of military accidents. The accidents that were analyzed in
this current study occurred, with a few exceptions, on
helicopters that had no stability and control augmentation
and furthermore, in daylight conditions without DVE.
Referencing the Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities Rating
Scale (ref. 3), it is the authors’ opinion that the handling
qualities of a large number of the helicopters involved
could be categorized as having from “very objectionable”
to “major” deficiencies. Furthermore, it implies that
extensive pilot compensation is required for adequate
performance and, in the worst cases, considerable
compensation is required to maintain control of the
helicopter under adverse conditions.
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Figure 1. Hover and Low Airspeed Helicopter Mishaps
1993–2004 (as a Percentage of All Helicopter Mishaps).
With few exceptions, the accidents reviewed resulted in
substantial damage, or in some cases the destruction of the
helicopter. This is not surprising since any time the main
rotor or tail rotor of a helicopter contacts the ground,
substantial damage will result. The NTSB does not assign
a dollar value to damage classified as “Substantial,” and
the definition is very broad in scope: “substantial damage
means damage or structural failure that adversely affects
the structural strength, performance, or flight character-
istics of the aircraft, and that would normally require major
repair or replacement of the affected part.” Large sums may
be spent to repair damage from accidents that do not meet
the NTSB Part 830 definition of “substantial damage.”
BACKGROUND
A study of recent (1963–1997) helicopter accidents in the
U.S. (ref. 4), attributed 1,114 accidents, or 13.2% of the
accidents studied, to loss of control. In the categories of
single engine piston and turbine helicopters, these
accidents resulted in 247 fatalities, 228 serious injuries,
and 319 helicopters destroyed. These categories of
helicopters generally do not have stability and control
augmentation systems installed or available. It would not
be possible to speculate, without a detailed study of each
event, that any particular number or percentage of these
accidents could have been prevented by the incorporation
of rate or attitude command control augmentation into the
flight control systems. Many of the occurrences studied in
reference 4 undoubtedly were also analyzed in this current
study, since the time periods overlapped for some of the
years. Isler and De Maio (ref. 5) noted that the chain of
accident events for personal and instructional missions in a
large number of helicopter accidents began with loss of
control. These accidents, for the low cost category of
helicopters, accounted for 48.2% of the total accidents.
In 1998, a Final Report of the joint Department of
Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Helicopter
Accident Analysis Team was published (ref. 6). It was
surprising to note throughout the report that there was no
mention of poor handling qualities, nor the resulting
failure of the pilot to maintain control of the helicopter, as
factors in any of the accidents reviewed from NTSB data.
The FAA’s National Aviation Safety Data Analysis
Center (NASDAC) reports were not included, nor were
there recommendations in the Safety Investments section
of the report (ref. 6) to improve the designs of control
systems to enhance the handling qualities of the
helicopters. As a result of the Accident Team’s report, a
workshop was held in July of 1998 in response to the
recommendations of that body. Subsequently, a report
entitled “Near Term Gains in Rotorcraft Safety—Strategies
for Investment” was published in February, 1999 (ref. 7).
Although statistics were discussed which tied many
mishaps to “loss of control,” once again there were no
recommended actions to improve civil rotorcraft safety by
the improvement of helicopter handling qualities.
Emphasis was placed on training, obstacle protection, risk
management, accident analyses, and even the use of night
vision goggles.
ANALYSIS
The assessment of the accident reports reviewed has, by
necessity, involved qualitative and subjective judgments
by the authors. The obvious cases that did not involve
handling qualities, such as attempting to takeoff to a hover
with one skid tied down, were easily eliminated from
consideration. There were also cases where pilots ran out
of available power, which often resulted in a loss of main
rotor RPM and subsequently a loss of control
authority—especially in the yaw axis. Controlled descents
into the ground, in many cases, also had to be discounted,
as did mechanical failures that resulted in loss of control.
Others involving loss of tail rotor control power or
authority were more difficult. In many cases, hovering
downwind or in a stiff crosswind might have resulted in an
accident by a pilot with low experience; however, the
experienced pilot could work his way through the
condition without losing control. A student or low time
pilot will, in many cases, over-control the helicopter and
use all of the available control authority. There were many
cases where precision was required while hovering near
obstacles. Often in these cases, little or no position drift
could be tolerated. At times, depending on the winds and
terrain, a “skids level” attitude was imperative at
3touchdown to avoid the potential for a rollover or fore/aft
pitching which could cause main rotor or tail rotor contact
with the terrain.
A total of 547 accidents were thoroughly reviewed from
the years 1993–2004. Initially, the accidents reviewed
involved only those occurring in hovering or near
hovering flight. This review was expanded to include
many accidents which occurred in low speed flight either
during takeoffs, approaches to landing, or low speed
maneuvering. Of the total, 126 (or 23%) could be
attributed to loss of control by the pilot which was caused
or aggravated by inadequate or deficient handling qualities.
There were also ten accidents that involved gyroplanes or
gyrocopters and these were discarded from the matrix. It
was noted that there were three fatalities, one serious
injury, and four minor injuries attributed to these ten
single pilot/occupant accidents. Pilot experience was
typically low and it may be inferred that flying this type
of hybrid rotorcraft is particularly challenging for
inexperienced, though adventurous, aviators.
Many manufacturers were represented in the accident
statistics as compared to the four models studied by Key
(ref. 1). Fifteen different manufacturers were listed to
include homebuilt or kit helicopters consolidated as one
category. There were over thirty various models
represented.
MISHAP SUMMARY EXAMPLES
A few summary examples of mishaps reviewed illustrate
the potential improvement in helicopter safety and
reduction in accidents that could be achieved if helicopter
handling quality were improved by the addition of stability
and control augmentation systems. While these cases
involve egregious examples of handling qualities
deficiencies, they are unfortunately all too representative of
the accidents studied:
Case 1: This flight involved a surplus UH-1H helicopter
operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority in daylight
under moderate, downwind wind conditions (9 knots
gusting to 19 reported at an airport 5 miles east of the
mishap site). It had flown for 1.2 hours before the pilot
attempted to come to an OGE hover over a power pole for
the attachment of an external load. Commands were given
to the pilot to “ease the aircraft down and hold position;
move left and move right.” The helicopter drifted to the
left and forward. After this, a command to back off and try
again was followed by repetitive “move left” commands.
The main rotors struck a workman on the pole, the pole
itself, and the helicopter rolled right in a descent and struck
the ground. There were no engine or flight control
malfunctions and the pilots were highly qualified. Four
fatalities and one minor injury resulted from this accident.
This was a precision task for an external load hookup in
an OGE hover in an unaugmented helicopter. It is our
contention that an improved control system, to include
stability augmentation, could have enabled the pilot to
achieve the high degree of precision required to hold
position and complete the hookup.
Case 2: A single engine, turbine powered, teetering rotor
helicopter crashed in snow covered terrain in daylight under
Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) with 1 mile
visibility. The pilot was attempting to land next to a
snow gauging station and he flew past it. With the snow
cover and reduced visibility, the pilot had poor visual
references and allowed the skids to contact the terrain.
Collective pitch was applied, the pilot attempted to
stabilize the helicopter in hover, but it drifted forward and
to the left. The left skid contacted the terrain and the
helicopter rolled on its left side. Although there were no
injuries to the three on board, the helicopter was destroyed.
The whiteout conditions encountered resulted in a classic
loss of control in a degraded visual environment. An
effective stability augmentation system could have allowed
the pilot to maintain a level attitude, hold position, and
either land level, pull up for another landing attempt, or
abort the mission.
Case 3: A single engine (piston) helicopter was to be
flown on a maintenance test flight for track and balance of
the main rotor. The pilot suddenly applied collective pitch
for takeoff and the helicopter rose to about four feet and
began to yaw left and right and then pitch forward and aft.
The pilot attempted to stabilize the helicopter, but the
main rotor blades struck the ground to the front and the
helicopter rolled on to its right side. There were no
injuries to the pilot or mechanic, but the damage incurred
was substantial. In this case, abrupt and excessive control
application caused the pilot to lose control of the unstable
helicopter in hover. Although the pilot’s control
manipulation and activity were determined to be the cause
of the accident, perhaps he could have recovered if the
helicopter had been a more stable platform through the
incorporation of stability augmentation.
Case 4: On a dual instructional flight, a Student Pilot
(SP) lifted the single engine, piston engine, two-place
helicopter to a three-foot hover. The SP then “over
controlled” the helicopter and caused it to drift to the left
in a descent. The left skid contacted the ground and the
helicopter rolled on to its left side. There were no injuries,
4but the helicopter sustained substantial damage. From
reading many similar accounts, these Student Pilots could
use more stable helicopters that are more forgiving of their
inexperience.
Case 5: In another single engine, piston engine helicopter
on a dual instructional flight, the student pilot developed a
high rate of descent at slow speed. A rapid application of
collective resulted in an uncommanded rotation to the right
which the instructor was unable to arrest. In the course of
the attempt to regain rotor speed lost during that recovery,
the aircraft impacted the ground and sustained significant
damage.
Case 6: A high-time fixed-wing pilot with limited
helicopter experience, flying a single turbine-engine
helicopter, encountered an uncommanded rotation to the
right. He failed to reduce the engine throttle to idle and
impacted the ground after multiple rotations. The probable
cause determined by the NTSB was a loss of tail rotor
effectiveness (LTE) coupled with the pilot’s failure to
initiate a timely correction.
RESULTS
The issues which were causal factors, and which also
illustrated deficiencies in handling qualities, could be
grouped into four broad categories as follows:
Stability Augmentation
Helicopters are inherently less stable than airplanes. If an
unaugmented helicopter in hovering flight is disturbed
from equilibrium, its attitude continues to diverge until
corrective control inputs are made by the pilot. Most
airplanes, however, are inherently stable and when they are
disturbed from equilibrium restoring moments are
generated. Only so much can be done with the fundamental
handling qualities of the basic helicopter and manufacturers
generally design the low end helicopter to meet the
minimum requirements of FAR 27. Additional
aerodynamic modifications to the airframe to improve
handling qualities, such as fins or strakes, are often costly,
add weight, and can produce additional drag with resulting
performance penalties. Many helicopters in use today do
not have to meet even the minimum standards for the
same class of helicopter being built under the current
requirements.
In the late seventies the Helicopter Association
International (HAI), then the Helicopter Association of
America (HAA), held a convention in Mission Valley,
California, near San Diego. The convention was located in
a hotel adjacent to a golf course and helicopters were
allowed to land and takeoff in a clear grassy area next to
the parking lot. It was apparent from operations observed
at this temporary heliport that a particular Bell 206 was
very stable while hovering, landing, and taking off near
the other operating helicopters. The pilot’s control of
pitch and roll attitude was precise with very little
oscillation. From an orientation flight in the helicopter, it
was determined that it was equipped with a Sfena “Mini-
Stab.” This package had been optimized for the pitch and
roll axes, and the yaw axis augmentation was still being
developed. For the hover and in-flight operations, the
improvements in handling qualities were immediately
apparent. The pilot workload was reduced significantly and
precision was improved considerably. It was an impressive
accomplishment for this small helicopter which might
otherwise be described as “squirrelly” by some operators
for some tasks—to include hover and hover taxi in a
crosswinds and low speed flight in turbulence.
A call to the Bell 206 Product Support division in
Mirabel, Canada, revealed that a stability augmentation
package is not offered as an option for the Bell 206 series
of helicopters. This stability augmentation system is
installed in the Navy TH-57C helicopters used for
advanced flight training and was required to meet military
standards for certification for single-piloted instrument
flight. This package was designed in the late seventies and
early eighties and today’s technology should permit the
design of an inexpensive, lightweight stability augmen-
tation system for even the low-end helicopters on the
market. Hydraulic servo technology, where applicable, has
also progressed to permit this integration at a lower cost
and weight.
More recently, an Attitude Command/Attitude Hold
augmentation system, HeliSAS, has been developed and
tested (ref. 8). The system weighs only 12 pounds and the
projected cost is $30,000. It was demonstrated on an R-44
test aircraft and was evaluated by pilots from the Robinson
factory—as well as a NASA test pilot and one from the
National Test Pilot School. “Very favorable” comments
were received. According to the FAA, a low cost SAS has
never been certificated, considerable work needs to be done
to establish standards, and current rules are not adequate. If
these are reasons for not proceeding, then the FAA needs
to move ahead with the formulation of standards and revise
the current rules. Lightweight, low cost systems such as
the one described, have the potential to significantly reduce
accidents attributed to poor handling qualities.
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(April–May 2001) began the process to look at the lowest
levels of stability and control augmentation that could be
used to safely operate a “low-end” helicopter single pilot
under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). It would follow that
the application of even minimum levels of augmentation
for instrument flight to this category of helicopter could
make a significant reduction in accidents in hover and low
speed flight under VMC.
Attitude or even rate stabilization can reduce the
possibility of a pilot induced oscillation (PIO) developing
by providing a more crisp response to control inputs about
all axes and by providing the damping that permits
smooth control of the helicopter’s attitude and position.
Overshoot and over controlling are reduced, if not
eliminated, even for the novice pilot. While manufacturers
and operators strive to hold down the manufacturing,
acquisition, and operating costs of the lower end
helicopters, perhaps it would be appropriate for operators
to re-examine the costs of these “loss of control”
accidents. As previously stated in this review of hover,
near hover, and low speed accidents, it was common to
find substantial damage or destruction of the helicopter.
Substantial damage equals large expenses which the low
profit margin operator cannot afford to sustain without his
business being threatened. By investing additional dollars
up front in the acquisition of at least a minimal stability
and control augmentation system, the helicopter could be
flown more safely by pilots at all experience levels with
more precision and less pilot fatigue.
One particular type of operation that requires precise
positioning by the pilot is the external load or sling load
mission. It involves pick-up and placement of loads
suspended beneath the helicopter. Often they are conducted
in close proximity to obstacles and they require a high
degree of precision and demand a high workload of the
pilot. In this survey, 85 (or 15%) of the accidents occurred
during external load operations, far exceeding the FAA
determined helicopter utilization rate of 6% for this
mission area (ref. 9), as shown in figure 2. Although most
of these accidents could not be attributed to poor handling
qualities, pilots involved in these operations need a stable
platform for this precision task. Only six of the mishap
aircraft in external load operations were equipped with an
attitude command system. An attitude command system
would have been a significant improvement for the
twenty-one helicopters involved that did have stability
augmentation (rate command).    Any   augmentation would
be a step in the right direction for the helicopters involved
in the remaining accidents. It was sobering to calculate the
toll from these external load accidents as a matter of
information. There were 38 fatalities, 26 serious injuries,
and 20 minor injuries. Twenty-six helicopters were
destroyed and all of the others, with one exception,
incurred substantial damage. It follows that this operation
can be classified as hazardous regardless of handling
qualities. Precise handling qualities are dictated by the
tight tolerances required for these tasks. This highlights
the benefits accrued by incorporating stability
augmentation in helicopters performing this mission.
Directional Control
The FAA Advisory Circular, AC-90-95, “Unanticipated
Right Yaw in Helicopters” (ref. 10), states that the loss of
tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) is a critical, aerodynamic
flight characteristic which can result in an uncommanded
right yaw rate which will not “subside” (damp) of its own
accord. If not corrected, it can result in the loss of aircraft
control. The AC also states that “there is a greater
susceptibility for LTE in right turns. This is especially
true during flight at low airspeed since the pilot may not
be able to stop rotation. The helicopter will attempt to
yaw to the right and correct and timely response to this
uncommanded yaw is critical. The yaw is usually
correctable if additional left pedal is applied immediately.
If the response is incorrect or slow, the yaw rate may
rapidly increase to a point where recovery is not possible.”
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For the accidents surveyed, 82 (or 15%) involved LTE
(fig. 3). Recognizing the conditions that can lead to LTE
is very important and the pilot’s situational awareness is
critical at all times. What direction is the wind with
respect to the helicopter’s heading? How much tail rotor
control margin remains in terms of pedal applied? How
much collective pitch can be applied before maximum
available power is commanded and main rotor and tail
rotor RPM start to decay? For the student or low time
helicopter pilot, these in-flight judgments are often gained
only through experience—which comes at a high price in
too many cases. The Army and Air Force versions of the
H-21 tandem rotor helicopter (unaugmented), used for a
few years in the early stages of the Vietnam conflict,
always acted as though it wanted to swap ends.
Accordingly, the pilot workload in the yaw axis was very
high.
Anyone who has flown or spent much time as a passenger
in any of a long list of small, unaugmented helicopters, is
aware of their directional instability. A typical maneuver,
which illustrates the “squirrel like” response of the
machine, is the crosswind hover or hover taxi. The pilot
must constantly make high frequency pedal inputs of
varying size to keep the helicopter heading in the desired
direction. The tail boom dances to the right and left as the
position is held or as the taxi proceeds. It is a high
workload task and precision is lacking. With a capable
yaw SCAS—especially one designed for attitude
command—the pilot’s workload and precision and the
passenger’s comfort are dramatically improved.
A less attractive alternative might entail building in more
directional control power by improving the tail rotor
design to produce more thrust, increasing engine power
available to provide that thrust, and making suitable
aerodynamic changes to the fuselage and tail boom designs
to improve the yaw stability of the helicopter. All of these
changes, where applicable and practical, could result in
significant weight, cost, and performance penalties.
Teetering Rotors
In a significant number of the accidents reviewed, the
helicopter’s design incorporated a teetering rotor system.
Of 547 accidents, 308 (or 56%) of the helicopters had
teetering rotor systems (fig. 4). The numbers may, on the
face of the data, be misleading. Teetering rotor systems are
incorporated in helicopters that have been produced in large
numbers for many years. Two manufacturers today are
very successful in supplying this teetering rotor system
design to the world market. One series of helicopters is
relatively inexpensive (approximately $175,000 and up),
powered by a piston engine, and is frequently utilized in
pilot training. However, flight training by its nature
accounts for a disproportionate number of mishaps. By
contrast, the rigid or hingeless rotor systems tend to be
incorporated in more sophisticated aircraft, employed in
specific missions such as medical transport, and flown by
more experienced pilots.
The semi-rigid or teetering type of rotor accomplishes
blade flapping by (as the name describes) a teetering
motion of the two bladed rotor system. This gives the
helicopter a balanced lift distribution between the
advancing and retreating blades and prevents a rolling
moment from developing. The teetering system differs
from articulated systems which allow individual blades to
flap, and hingeless rotor systems which accomplish
flapping by bending of the individual rotor blades to
change their angles of attack as the blades advance and
retreat. The teetering rotor, in particular, has a significant,
built-in phase lag from the pilot’s control input to the
main rotor, until the pitching or rolling moment is
generated. An absence of rate damping only aggravates the
condition. This alone can cause a student pilot to put in a
larger control input than is required, which eventually
results in a larger roll or pitch rate than desired and can
ultimately lead to PIO. Without an instructor there to
damp the oscillation, a rollover can result if the main rotor
or landing gear should contact the surface.
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Figure 4. Mishaps by Type of Rotor System.
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result in the rotor hub contacting the mast. This is known
as mast bumping and unless it is just a very light tap, the
result can be a sheared mast in flight which is usually fatal
to all onboard. Unless, of course, the helicopter is at a
very low altitude and airspeed (hover IGE, for instance). In
the early design versions of the OH-23 (UH-12), the hub
had a circular cutout for the mast. It wasn’t long before a
few fatal accidents took place and investigation proved that
mast bumping occurred when excessive blade flapping
angles allowed hub to mast contact. The fix was quite
simple. The hub cutout was elongated under the blades to
allow additional degrees of flapping and the serious design
flaw was resolved.
In this survey, only three of the hover or low speed
accidents were attributed to mast bumping with subsequent
shearing and separation of the main rotor mast. These
accidents did result in four fatalities, however. A single
engine helicopter accident in August, 2000, near
Watsonville, CA, which resulted in two fatalities, was
attributed to mast bumping by an operator, demonstration
team leader, and dealer. The NTSB report also stated that
the probable cause was mast bumping. Although the event
occurred in cruise flight, and not hover or low speed, the
teetering rotor design is susceptible to this type of accident
from excessive, uncoordinated, and abrupt cyclic control
inputs.
For all of these disadvantages, the teetering rotor
helicopter has one distinct advantage over many
helicopters that use an articulated rotor system with
flapping or “droop” stops. That is the ability to start or
stop the rotor in much higher winds and turbulence—with
or without a rotor brake. In addition, the design of the
teetering rotor system’s hub is not complex and it is quite
rugged and reliable with low maintenance requirements. It
does not have the susceptibility to ground resonance which
helicopters incorporating articulated designs can encounter.
Blade attachment failures for this simple design, with the
resulting catastrophic loss of a blade, are rare, as compared
to articulated rotor designs. These features make it a choice
for many low end helicopters and also for the homebuilt
market.
Instrument Flight
The first civil helicopter certificated for flight in
Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) in the
United States was the Bell 212. In order to achieve the
level of handling qualities imposed by the Federal
Aviation Administration, an expensive package of
instrumentation and stability augmentation improvements
had to be incorporated in this twin engine helicopter.
Since that time, many high end helicopters have been
certificated for IFR operation to include single pilot
operation. Contrast that with the long time operation of
the venerable UH-1 “Huey” by the Army under Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR) flying the airways and making
approaches in IMC to both military and civil airports.
This was done in a helicopter whose total stability
augmentation consisted of the stabilizer bar mounted
above and 90 degrees to the main rotor. It produced a
slight damping of the main rotor displacements by its
gyroscopic and inertial effect. Flying under IMC,
especially in turbulence, was a high workload task in these
military helicopters and it required a high degree of
training and proficiency. For the civil version of these
helicopters (Bell 204, 205), flight under instrument
conditions is prohibited.
During the Vietnam War, the demand for helicopter pilots
was so great that the practice of fully qualifying Army
pilots for instrument flight was discontinued. The pipeline
for pilots had to be filled as attrition and rotation to other
assignments after the one year tour of duty depleted the
“inventory” of pilots. As a stopgap measure, a few hours
of instrument training were put in the syllabus and the
pilots were awarded “Tactical Instrument Tickets.” This
minimal training was tailored to permit the pilot to get
himself out of encounters with inadvertent IMC or, in
other words, perform the 180 degree turn to fly back to
visual conditions. This did not always work and many
young pilots were not proficient. Add the additional
complication of night conditions and the stage was set for
many non-combat deaths which occurred with some
regularity. Many days and nights were IMC, especially
during the long rainy seasons, but the war had to go on
and missions had to be flown. Many helicopters, such as
the OH-6A, OH-58A, and the AH-1G, were not designated
for instrument flight even by fully qualified pilots. The
entire fleet of Army helicopters at that time would not
meet FAA standards for instrument flight. The handling
qualities were generally inadequate, most had no stability
augmentation, and if so equipped, rate command was the
system installed.
There have been attempts to “fix” poor handling qualities
of some helicopters with the addition of avionics such as
Flight Directors. While these additions can reduce the
workload of the pilot and permit greater precision during
the instrument approach task, they cannot improve the
fundamental flying qualities of a helicopter or any aircraft.
They are effectively used in combination with stability
augmentation to provide the pilot with the required
precision and a manageable workload. The FAA imposes
8standards for handling qualities as defined in the Federal
Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 27; however, these
require only minimal standards. Military helicopters must
meet the requirements of ADS-33D-PRF which are more
stringent than those of the old MIL-H-8501. Even so,
some military helicopters have had extremely poor
handling qualities in the past and many of these
helicopters are still in military or civilian service today.
Very few of the accidents reviewed occurred at night. Night
conditions, on a cloudy or moonless night where there is
no visible horizon, can often be likened to instrument
conditions. It can be speculated that similar conditions can
result in many accidents due to spatial disorientation.
Many helicopters in use today do not have the minimum
instrumentation, much less the stabilization, to be flown
under real or quasi-instrument conditions—even in
emergencies. The lack of any rate or attitude stabilization
in the design of helicopters was continued for decades in
many helicopters, both military and civil, and continues to
this day.
CONCLUSIONS
From the analysis made of the accidents occurring in hover
or low speed flight for this current study, it can be inferred
that a significant number of previously documented
accidents could have been prevented if the mishap
helicopters had improved handling qualities.
From the accidents reviewed, and the other statistics on
civil helicopter accidents attributed to loss of control, it is
puzzling why poor handling qualities have not been
pinpointed as causes or factors in the accidents.
Improvements in handling qualities were not even
recommended, within the scope of this research, as a
means or investment in safety to reduce the frequency of
such accidents.
It can be inferred that a significant reduction in accidents,
injuries, and property damage could be achieved by the
integration of stability augmentation systems into the
control systems of the lower priced helicopters. Where this
investment has already been made in the higher priced
machines, the benefits of a more sophisticated
augmentation system (Attitude Command) could be
substantial in terms of helicopter safety.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The feasibility of designing or incorporating a low cost,
lightweight stability augmentation system should be
explored by the helicopter airframe manufacturers. Today’s
technology may provide the means to accomplish a goal
of significantly improving the handling qualities of their
helicopters. Where a hydraulic system is not practical for
inclusion in the design, the technology exists to provide
the secondary or automatic flight control system functions
with small electrical actuators. A reduction in the accident
rates will surely follow. When the other safety investment
strategies are implemented, the goal of reducing the
accident rate by as much as 50% may be realistic.
In 1966, NASA published the results of handling qualities
evaluations of seven General Aviation aircraft
manufactured in the United States (ref. 11). This
investigation revealed that the handling qualities of the
class of general aviation aircraft, although   generally  
satisfactory   for flight under VMC and instrument flight in
smooth air, were degraded when atmospheric turbulence
was encountered. Although the particular aircraft
designations and manufacturers were not stated, the
illustrations of the various types of light airplanes
evaluated effectively identified the selected models.
It is recommended that representative classes of light,
piston engine and turbine powered helicopters be similarly
evaluated to assess their handling qualities and to
document the deficiencies. In our opinion, strong
recommendations would be forthcoming to improve the
handling qualities of this class of helicopter.
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Comments on Adjunct Safety Issues
Post Crash Fires: Many helicopters involved in
survivable accidents have experienced post crash fires that
have caused thermal injuries and fatalities to crew and
passengers. The Army pioneered the development of
crashworthy fuel systems based on the incidence of post
crash fires in their fleet of helicopters and the resulting
injuries and deaths to crews and passengers. An early
historical example involved the OH-13 helicopter. Until
the OH-13H was introduced, the incidence of post crash
fires in hover accidents was nominal for this particular
helicopter. The “H” Model configuration had two “saddle”
fuel tanks mounted high behind the cockpit bubble. As
operational time was accumulated on this new model, the
incidence of post crash fires and thermal injuries increased
dramatically in fully survivable accidents. A study, which
included the use of a tethered helicopter deliberately crashed
from hover, revealed that components of the rotating
swashplate (swashplate driver) struck the tanks and slashed
them open. The resulting fine fuel spray was easily
ignited. As a quick fix for this problem, the Army devised
a system to wrap the tanks with a tough nylon fabric
impregnated with a resin to seal it to the tanks after
wrapping. The objective was to provide some tear
resistance to the tanks and reduce the loss of fuel in the
event of swashplate contact. Many of these helicopters are
still flying today, without any added protection, as Bell 47
models.
The expansion of Army Aviation during the years of the
United States’ involvement in the Republic of Vietnam
led the Army to develop the Crashworthy Fuel System for
its fleet of UH-1 and other helicopters. The design was
simple, but it prevented many post crash fires and the
injuries and fatalities which, in many cases, would have
resulted. The fuel bladders were constructed of a heavier,
tear resistant rubberized fabric and break away fuel fittings
were incorporated in the fuel lines and hoses. These
fittings would break loose on impact and seal the lines and
tanks to contain the fuel. On the downside, the thicker
bladders weighed more and reduced the fuel capacity of the
aircraft slightly. For example, a UH-1H (Bell 205)
original tank held 220 gallons of jet fuel. After the
modified tanks were installed, fuel capacity was 211
gallons or a 4% reduction. This was not too great a price
to pay for the significant reduction in thermal injuries and
fatalities that resulted from the incorporation of this
technology into this large fleet of Army helicopters.
This technology, applied to the civil variants of many
Army helicopters, could extend these safety benefits to
larger segments of the private and corporate sectors.
Amendments to FAR Parts 27 and 29 require that a
crashworthy fuel system be included in the design of any
helicopter for which a new type certificate has been
applied. It does not, however, apply to helicopters
certificated prior to the effective date of the amendments.
These helicopters, which number in the thousands, will
not afford the crews and passengers the vital protection
from, and the reduced likelihood of, post crash fires.
Retrofit kits could be designed and marketed for the civil
sector.
The application of this technology should also be
considered for retrofit in the huge fleet of General Aviation
fixed wing aircraft. It is true that it would involve
considerable expense and result in a small reduction in fuel
capacity. This should be factored against the many lives
that would be saved in otherwise survivable accidents. The
disfiguring and incapacitating burns that result in the
survivable “crash and burn” accidents should also be
considered when tallying up the true costs of the
modifications versus the human misery that could be
prevented.
The occurrences of post crash fires for the hover and low
speed cases studied were not excessive, but the Army’s
experience, prior to the installation of the crashworthy
systems, was sobering.
Teetering Rotor Systems: As noted in the main body of
the report in the Results section, the military services had
many fatal accidents attributed to mast bumping in the
UH-1 series of helicopters that were employed by the
thousands. Although a significant number of mast
bumping accidents were not noted in this report, it was
considered important to describe the conditions conducive
to mast bumping for those not familiar with this usually
fatal occurrence.
The problem was accentuated and aggravated when the
Army began to use nap-of-the-earth and terrain following
tactics to avoid the shoulder fired missile threat in the
Republic of Vietnam. For many years in Vietnam, the
helicopters flew at approximately 1500 feet above the
terrain to avoid much of the effective small arms fire
(7.62mm). With the introduction of the Russian Strela
heat seeking missiles into the combat zone, the tactics
changed and put the helicopters “down on the deck.” Mast
bumping accidents began to occur more frequently and it
was learned that they were due to a combination of
circumstances. When the pilot pushed the nose of the
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helicopter down rapidly to stay near or get close to the
terrain, such as flying over a ridge, the helicopter rotor
experienced less than 1g conditions. This caused large
rotor flapping angles. When aggravated by a combination
of abrupt control inputs, aft center of gravity, or sideslip,
a fatal mast bump could occur. Immediate training
remedies were used to make pilots aware of the conditions
that caused mast bumping and how to avoid them. In
addition, a thick walled mast was developed to replace all
of the rotor masts in the entire fleet of UH-1 helicopters.
The intent was to be able to sustain a light mast bump
without shearing. Hub springs were also incorporated in
the design of these teetering rotor helicopters to aid in
controlling the flapping of the main rotor.
While the lessons of this conflict only bear peripherally
on the discussion at hand, they do begin to apply in the
low airspeed regime and would likely find even greater
significance in extending this work to an analysis for the
forward flight regime.
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